

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
 JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE JULIAN GARCIA VARGAS
 OF SPAIN
 MADRID, SPAIN
 SEPTEMBER 28, 1994

Q. Jose Grau, Daily ABC, Madrid

When do you think the Czech Republic will join NATO and second is if you wish that the States lift the arms embargo on Bosnia (sic).

A. On the first question, there are several conditions before any nation is qualified to join NATO, because NATO and the membership into NATO is not an entitlement, as a nation has to be able to really contribute to the alliance as well as receive guarantees from it, and this requires a market economy in the country and a democratic government. It requires the ability to train with, work with NATO military forces. Today, several of them, of which the Czech Republic is one, desire to become members, and are working to that end. They are participating in joint training, joint exercises. They are attending NATO meetings, learning NATO doctrine. They are also coincidentally seeking to become members of the European Community and that will affect their economic integration and that happens. So that I would think that within a few years the Czech Republic might become a member of the European Community and some number of months after that might be a member of NATO. Of all of the nations that seek to become a member of NATO, I think that the Czech Republic is probably the furthest advanced in that regard.

On the second question which is the United States lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, we have a legislation now that we should go to the United Nations on the 15th of October and seek a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. I think it is doubtful that the United Nations will act on that multilateral lifting will actually occur. I detected very little interest or sentiment in that among the European nations. There will then be pressure in the United States for a unilateral lifting of the embargo. I have several concerns about that move and hope that we can avoid it. The concerns of that move are that it may cause a split between the United States and its allies in Europe who do not favor that lifting. It may precipitate some of the nations who are UNPROFOR members pulling their troops out of UNPROFOR. And therefore it could lead to a widening and intensification of the war which would be a very undesirable result. Therefore, I think it is important to try to accelerate the moves toward a peace plan which had been proposed by the so called International Contact Group and that means I believe putting additional pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to respond to that peace plan. That pressure can come from the U.N., it can come from NATO, in the form of more vigorous air strikes under the present mandate, or it can come from the Serbs who have urged the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan and are now imposing an embargo on them as a result of the Bosnian Serbs not accepting the peace plan. All of those things will cause additional pressure

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and hopefully will lead to an acceptance of the peace plan so that it will not be necessary to take the action of lifting the embargo.

Another question.

- Q. Yo le planteo la pregunta en español para que la entiendan todos mis compañeros, entonces la cuestión es (Let me pose my question in Spanish so that all my colleagues here can understand)

¿Se va a encontrar Vd. con el Presidente del gobierno después de haber tenido un encuentro con el Sr. García Vargas?. ¿Va Vd. a plantear algún tipo de colaboración entre España y los Estados Unidos en el tema Haití, para la segunda fase del plan de Naciones Unidas?. ¿Como ven Uds., de alguna manera, la iniciativa española dentro de la alianza atlántica para que se preste una mayor atención al Mediterráneo y el papel que ese nuevo planteamiento podría seguir jugando la VI flota norteamericana?.

(You will be meeting with the Prime Minister after this meeting with Minister Garcia Vargas. Will you mention some kind of cooperation between Spain and the U.S. on Haiti during the second phase of the U.N. peacekeeping plan. What is your opinion on the Spanish Initiative within the Atlantic Alliance so that it pays more attention to the Mediterranean and what role will the U.S. Sixth Fleet have?)

- A. On the first question we will request that Spain participate in the UN force in Haiti that is UNMIH, U.N. Mission in Haiti, by providing police trainees, that is trainers who can bring up a professional police force in Haiti, how to maintain security in the months ahead.

And the second question. We have I believe, that a major item of discussion at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting will be dealing with the security problems in the southern flank of NATO. It's my own opinion that the center of attention in NATO is shifting from the central region to the southern flank. I discussed this, this morning with your Defense Minister. We will both be discussing it at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting. I previously discussed it in bilateral meetings with the Italian Defense Minister and the Greek Defense Minister. There is no doubt in my mind that NATO needs to be looking south and pay much more attention to security problems on its southern flank.

- Q. How long is going to take the U.S. operation in Haiti, secondly how did you sign a treaty with General Cedras without asking him to leave the country. You know how difficult is the restoration of democracy down there. How can you permit that General Cedras stays in Haiti

- A. The first question is how long we are going to be in Haiti. I wish I could answer that precisely. I can give you some factors on ..., leading to that judgment. We are there

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to assure security and stability in Haiti, which will permit the legal government to return, which will permit free and fair parliamentary elections which will happen, perhaps in December of this year and will permit humanitarian aid to flow into the country beginning immediately, actually it started flowing this week. It is difficult to predict how long that will take, but I would say that substantial U.S. military forces will probably be there through the rest of this year, certainly through the parliamentary elections which will probably be in December. We presently have 15 thousand troops in Haiti. Some of them combat, some of them engineering, some of them are military police. Many of them are already working to facilitate humanitarian flow. They're working at the port, at the airport to bring in many tons of humanitarian supplies which are starting to come in now. We also have the first advance party of international forces that are coming in and as those forces come in some of the U.S. forces will be able to return. Also the security, as the situation stabilizes we would expect to begin withdrawing U.S. forces perhaps within a few weeks, reducing the number of them. So the 15 thousand number I would hope would go down between now and the end of the year and then sometime early next year I would hope to be able to, that the U.S. military forces could turn over the responsibilities to ACNT?, the U.N. force. The ACNT? presently plans to have a force of about six thousand peace keeping troops in Haiti and the United States would expect to participate in that. So even though our military forces have gone out as part of the multinational force, we would expect to have, perhaps two thousand troops as a part of the ACNT?.

Sorry, the other question

- Q. Why did you sign an agreement with Cedras.....
- A. Let me be very clear. I think it would have been better, I think it is better if General Cedras does leave after the 15th and I believe he probably will. The question was why did we not insist on that in the agreement. And the answer was because he was not willing to sign that agreement. And we had the option then of insisting on that point and sending in an invasion to enforce it. And we had to balance between the dangers of an enforced entry, an invasion, which are very considerable. That disadvantage versus the disadvantage of having to deal with General Cedras perhaps staying on after the 15th. Between those two choices, we took the choice of not having to have the forced entry. That would have, we have no doubt, that we would have been successful in the forced entry, indeed we had our forces already in the air prepared to make a forced entry. But we have no doubt that there would have been substantial casualties on both sides and we were happy to have been able to avoid that even with this disadvantage.
- Q. I'm Charlie Aldinger of Reuters and I would like to ask Defense Minister Garcia Vargas two questions. Two very brief questions. Number 1, I wonder if you would tell us what your security concerns are on the southern flank with Muslim fundamentalism and number two did you discuss the sale of U.S. jets to Spain with the Secretary?
- A. Con respecto a la primera pregunta Espafia no considera que haya una amenaza

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militar procedente del norte de Africa. Si considera que hay un riesgo de inestabilidad producto de las tensiones sociales economicas y de distinto planteamiento de lo que deben ser las relaciones entre naciones cuando se introducen consideraciones de tipo religioso. Nosotros no creemos que haya un riesgo de una confrontacion de civilizaciones pero si el riesgo de falta de entendimiento con gobiernos que esten inspirados por ideas religiosas y no con ideas estrictamente politicas tal como las entendemos nosotros. Por eso se trata de que los regimenes moderados occidentales del norte de Africa tengan la oportunidad de mantener unas relaciones fluidas con todos los paises que estamos en la alianza y con la alianza misma. Esto se puede conseguir a traves de visitas, a traves de intercambios de militares y de politicos que puedan recibir informacion directa de la alianza sobre cual es su doctrina, cual es su vision de los problemas de seguridad en definitiva incrementar la confianza entre los paises del norte de Africa y los paises dentro de la alianza y de la alianza en si misma. Esto va mas alla, por supuesto, de la alianza, significa que los paises de la Union Europea tenemos que tomarnos mas en serio las relaciones comerciales con los paises del norte de Africa. Decisiones como las que se adoptaron hace dos anos negando a Marruecos facilidades comerciales deberian revisarse. Y deberiamos tener en cuenta que el desarrollo economico es la mejor garantia de que en esos paises haya regimenes moderados y que resistan las argumentaciones muy simplistas de los que ponen la religion por delante de cualquier otra consideracion.

The first question: Spain does not think there is a real military threat coming from North Africa. We do think there is a risk of instability as a result of social and economic tensions and because of the different ways nations have of viewing religious matters. We do not believe there is a risk of a clash of civilizations but we think there is a risk of lack of understanding with governments which are based on religious concepts and not on strictly political ones as we understand them. This is the reason why moderate, western governments in North Africa should be given the opportunity to maintain fluid relations with all the countries belonging to the Alliance and with the Alliance itself. This can be achieved through exchanges, political and military, which will provide direct access to the Alliance, on its doctrine and on how it sees security problems. It is, in short, a question of increasing the trust among North African countries, among countries within the Alliance and within the Alliance itself.

But this goes further (than strictly political relations with) the alliance. It means that the European Union countries have to take trade relations with North African countries more seriously. Decisions such as those adopted two years ago denying Morocco trade openings should be reviewed. We should also consider that economic development is the best guaranty for those countries to enjoy moderate governments that can cope with the simplistic arguments of those who put religion before any other consideration.

Respecto a los jets, no hemos tenido tiempo todavia de hablar de ese asunto. En el almuerzo vamos a comentarlo. La posicion espanola en cualquier caso es muy sencilla. El incremento de la flota de aviones de caza del ejercito del aire espanol no es necesaria pero no podemos diversificar excesivamente esa flota. Nosotros somos un pais mediano, tenemos ya dos tipos de aviones de caza, uno es norteamericano,

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el otro es francés; no quisiéramos tener un tercero. Los problemas logísticos y de mantenimiento que eso generaría serían muy grandes. Muchas gracias.

With regards to the buying of jets, we have had no time yet to talk about that. In any case, the Spanish position is a simple one. There is no need to increase the Spanish jet fleet. We are a middle size country in economic terms and have two types of warplanes; one is American, the second French. We do not wish to have a third one. The logistic and maintenance problems this would cause would be huge. Thank you.

END TRANSCRIPT